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Abstract
This paper quantifies the effect of Japanese rice imports on the Japanese rice
market with special attention to the farmland market in the year 2000. Tariff
and quota policies do not affect the equilibrium price of rice and rent
significantly given the current acreage controls.  The removal of the
acreage control program would reduce the autarky price of rice by 30%.
With free importation of rice into Japan, the price of rice would be halved,
and the potential increase in the consumer surplus could be 0.3% of the 1995
Japanese GDP.
JEL Classification: F14, Q17, Q18
1I. Introduction
This paper quantifies the effect of Japanese rice imports on the Japanese rice market with special
attention to the farmland market in the year 2000.  More specifically, it first shows the results of
simulating domestic equilibrium with the current acreage control program as a base line.  Second,
it compares the results of simulating the importation of 758,000 tons of white rice as the minimum
access quota temporarily approved by the GATT Uruguay Round Accord in the year 2000, and
the importation of rice subject to a specific tax within the limits of the same Accord after the
removal of the quota under the current acreage control program.  This comparison is relevant
because Japanese government promises to review its policy on rice imports once again in the year
2000, and it is quite likely that Japan will set a tariff within the limits of the GATT Uruguay Round
Accord instead of removing the current minimum access import quota which is valid only until the
year 2000.  Third, it shows the results of simulating a domestic equilibrium and a free-import
equilibrium without an acreage control program.  These simulations are useful for the
quantification of the welfare losses due to import restrictions on rice.
The innovation in this research is that it integrates the study of Japanese rice imports and the
literature on the Japanese farmland market using a competitive equilibrium approach.  By solving
for the competitive equilibrium in the rice and farmland markets simultaneously under the
assumption that the farmland market works within the flat agricultural areas, the paper quantifies
the effect of importation and the removal of acreage controls on the Japanese price of rice as well
as rent and the equilibrium farm size distribution in the flat agricultural areas.  The issues
addressed in this study are also examined in Fujiki [1993].  However, given the new world trade
system initiated by the GATT Uruguay Round Accord, this paper makes the assumptions for
policy simulations more realistic, and uses more recent data.
Former Japanese studies on the importation of rice into Japan, including the pioneering
study by Oga [1988], and work by the Forum for Policy Innovation [1990] and Kome Seisaku
Kenkyukai [1991], predict substantial decreases in the price of rice and relatively small decreases
in the domestic supply of rice.  This is because those studies assume a relatively inelastic
aggregate supply function for rice with respect to its price, and that Japan can import as much rice
as it wants at a constant world price.  Given the hike in the world price of rice after Japan
2imported rice to cope with the bad harvest in 1993, the small country assumption seems unsound.
Apart from this shortcoming, the previous models appear to be useful for the sake of short run
forecasts.  However, observing a substantial decline in the price of rice, farms might reduce the
level of rice production more than those models suppose.  In particular, if some of the decrease in
the price of rice coincides with a reduction in the rent for farmland and a reduction in the output
per area, it may be possible to find an equilibrium with a large reduction in the output per area and
the rent for farmland, and a small decrease in the price of rice.  Therefore, to predict long-run
equilibria, it is desirable to integrate the analysis of the Japanese rice and farmland markets.
In the mean time, Japanese studies on the farmland market going back to Imamura [1968]
and Kaji [1973] have focused on the possibility of large-scale tenant farming given institutional
farmland market imperfections (see details on farmland market regulation, for example, in Hayami
[1991]).  Generally, those studies discuss the amount of rent that the larger farms are willing to
pay and the minimum rent that the small farms are willing to receive, but do not examine equilibria
in the farmland and rice markets simultaneously.  However, this study predicts the equilibrium
farm size distribution, the equilibrium price of rice, and the equilibrium rent in the flat agricultural
areas using a competitive equilibrium approach.
In the year 2000, the Japanese government is likely to levy a specific tax on the importation
of rice within the limits of the GATT Uruguay Round Accord, instead of removing the minimum
access quota temporarily approved by the Accord.  The results of the simulations demonstrate
that the equilibrium with rice imports subject to such a tariff is not substantially different from
equilibrium with rice imports based on the minimum access import quota, as long as the current
acreage control program is effective.  It is also shown that the removal of the acreage control
program will reduce the autarky equilibrium price of rice by 30% compared with the autarky
equilibrium price with the acreage controls.  With free importation of rice into Japan, the price of
rice will be halved compared with the autarky price of rice, and the potential increase in the
consumer surplus amounts to 0.3% of the 1995 Japanese GDP.
The organization of this paper is as follows.  Section II introduces the model, Section III
explains the data, Section IV reports the results of the simulations, and Section V concludes the
paper.
3II. The Theoretical Model
I classify Japanese agricultural land into two types: the flat agricultural areas and the rest of Japan.
Within the flat agricultural areas, I assume that farms can adjust all inputs (such as variable inputs,
capital, labor and farmland) for production, given the prices of variable inputs, capital, labor and
rent.  Within the rest of Japan, I assume that farms only adjust variable inputs for production
given the price of variable inputs, and that the farmland market does not work.  The equilibrium
price of rice equates the aggregate demand for rice with the aggregate supply of rice, while the
equilibrium rent equates the demand for farmland by the farms in the flat agricultural areas with the
total farmland available in those areas given the equilibrium price of rice.  The details of the
theoretical model are explained in turn.
A.  Technology in the Flat Agricultural Area
Suppose farm i in the flat agricultural areas produces rice and has the following production
function:
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where y is the output of rice, A is a productivity parameter, V r presents variable inputs such as
fertilizer and seed, K is capital, L shows hours worked, T corresponds to the area in rice cultivation,
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where p is the price of rice, p j (j=V, K, L, T) is the factor price of input i, and
q = + + + <a a a a1 2 3 4 1.  The profit function of farmi will be:
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Using Hotelling’s lemma, the supply of rice by farm i will be:
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4and the demand for land by farm i will be:
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By aggregating Eq. ( 4 ) and Eq. ( 5 ), I have supply function for rice As1 and demand
function for land T  given p j  (j=V, K, L) and A,
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B. Farms in the Rest of Japan
As can be seen in Table 1, almost all of the labor inputs are family labor, and except for the larger
scale farms in the Tofuken region, farms are likely to cultivate their own land.  Why did such a
farmland distribution appear?  The answer lies in the history of Japanese farmland regulation (see,
for example, Hayami [1991]).  The Farmland Reform (1946-50) and the Agricultural Land Law
created a large number of small-scale, owner-cultivator farms in Japan under the upper limit on
farmland ownership, and prevented the owners from once again becoming poor tenant farmers.
This avoided a prevalence of large-scale, absentee landloads.  For example, rent was kept at a
lower level, and landloads were not allowed to terminate a farmland lease contract at their will,
even at the end of the contract period.  Part-time farming became possible during the 1960s
without requiring migration due to an increase in off-farm job opportunities and the introduction of
machines which enabled the elderly and women to participate in farm labor.  At the same time,
the increase in the price of farmland made it impossible for the usual farmers to purchase farmland
to expand.  Small farms did not rent their own land even after the removal of the upper limit on
the ownership of farmland in 1970, or after the legal arrangements such as the 1975 Farmland
Utilization Promotion Law.
There are several reasons why the farmland market does not work.  First, larger farms may
not be profitable enough to take over small farms.  Second, farms often have scattered ownership
and irregularly shaped paddies, which prevents the use of efficient, large-scale machines.  Third,
5there is a scarcity of flat land.  Finally, farms that expect to convert their paddies in the near
future do not want to rent their land because they want to be able to seize on the best time for
conversion.  Given such a historical background, it is useful to analyze a model in which the
allocations of machines, labor and land are given.  Specifically, suppose that farm k in the rest of
Japan produces rice according to the following production functions:
y A V Tk k k
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Eq. ( 8 ) is called the “Biochemical Technology Production Function” and Eq. ( 9 ) is called the
“Mechanical Production Function” by Egaitsu [1978].  Eq. ( 8 ) is not only useful for the fairly
precise prediction of output per area as can be seen in Fujiki [1993], but it can also be used to
show that the shift in the supply curve after the removal of acreage controls is almost proportional
to the increase in the area in rice cultivation.  Eq. ( 9 ) is consistent with the empirical observation
that almost all of the farms have their own machines, and that the larger farms generally have faster
and larger machines.  I assume that K, L, and T reflect the historical background explained in this
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Observe that if a1 = 0.15, then Eq. ( 10) corresponds to a conventional aggregate supply function
for rice with a constant price elasticity of supply of 0.18, as used in the Forum for Policy
Innovation [1990].
C. Equilibrium
Suppose there are T  hectares of paddies available for rice production in the flat agricultural area,
and that all of those paddies are supplied only for the sake of rice production.  Note that due to
the Agricultural Land Law, farmers cannot convert their paddies at their will, at least in the short
6run, but they are sometimes allowed to use them for non-agricultural purposes.  Hence, the
Japanese paddy field area declined at an annual rate of 0.7% between 1980 and 1992 according to
Kako, Gemma and Ito [1997].  It is hard to imagine a situation where farmers would create new
paddies for the sake of rice production.   Therefore, T  could be thought of as an upper limit on
the supply of paddies.  In reality, the upper limit is determined by the government acreage control
program.  Suppose further that the domestic aggregate demand for rice, Ad(p), epends only on
the price of rice, p.  Under these assumptions, there are two equilibrium conditions in the markets
for rice and farmland,
As p p As p Ad pT1 2( , ) ( ) ( )+ = , (  11  )
and
T Td p pT= ( , ). (  12  )
Solving Eq. ( 11 ) and Eq. ( 12 ) simultaneously yields the equilibrium price of rice, p, and the
equilibrium rent, pT , given p j  (j= V, K, L) and A.  First, a given p in Eq.( 12 ) determines a
unique pT  that clears the land market in the flat agricultural area, p p p TT T= ( , ), since the right
hand side of Eq. ( 12 ) is a decreasing function of pT  given p.  Plugging p p p TT T= ( , ) into Eq.
( 11 ) yields the equilibrium value of p* that satisfies Eq. ( 11 ).  Finally, the p p p TT T* ( *, )=
which satisfies Eq. ( 11 ) and Eq. ( 12 ) simultaneously is found.  Note that if there are R regions
separated geographically, and the assumption of a single farmland market is not plausible, Eq.
( 11 ) and Eq. ( 12 ) should be modified as follows:
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T Td p pr r Tr= ( , ), r = 1, ..., R. (  14  )
Here, subscript r represents region r.  To quantify the results of removing the current acreage
control program, regard Tr  as the acres of paddies potentially available for rice production under
the assumption that the current acreage control program is binding.  To examine the effect of rice
imports, one can add the overseas supply curve of Japonica rice to the left hand side of Eq. ( 13 ).
7III. Data
A. The Definition of Flat Agricultural Area
The Current Situation of Japanese Farmland, published by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry
and Fisheries in 1994, classifies Japanese farmland by the slope and size of its paddy fields.  I
assume the flat agricultural areas include all of the Hokkaido region, and 32.9% of the Tofuken
region.  This assumption is based on the statistical evidence that 78.6% of paddies whose size is
larger than 0.3 ha in the Hokkaido region and 32.9% of paddies whose size is larger than 0.3 ha in
the Tofuken region exist in the Agricultural Promotion Area whose slopes are less than 1/100 as
can be seen in Table 2.  By law, the paddies in the Agricultural Promotion Area are supposed to
be used for agricultural production.  The consolidation of smaller paddies into a paddy larger than
0.3 ha usually allows farmers to use larger machines efficiently and results in the working of an
efficient farmland market based on either sharing of machines or land lease contracts according to
the White Paper on Agriculture (1996).  Slopes less than 1/100 (the paddy rises less than one
meter within a hundred meters square) correspond to an engineering limitation that the
consolidation of small paddies into a large paddy, say 1.0 ha, by the government land improvement
program is economically feasible according to The Current Situation of Japanese Farmland.
Since the theoretical model in Section II assumes that the farmland market works in the flat
agricultural areas, I assume that 32.9% of paddies in the Tofuken region, where the assumption of
an active farmland market seems plausible, represent flat agricultural land.  Note that about 80%
of paddies in the Hokkaido region satisfy the condition for flat agricultural land defined above.
However, the total area of paddies in the Hokkaido region accounts for less than 10% of all the
paddies in Japan, as can be seen in Table 2.  Hence it is safe to assume for simplicity that all of the
paddies in the Hokkaido region are located within flat agricultural areas.  Therefore, in Eqs. ( 13 )
and ( 14 ), r = 1 and 2: the Tofuken region and the Hokkaido region respectively, and As22 = 0.
B. Farm Size Distribution
The Agriculture Census 1995 groups rice producing farms in each region by the size of the area in
rice cultivation, and reports the total number of farms and the total area in rice cultivation managed
8by those groups of farms in each region as of February 1995.  I assume that within each group,
farm size distribution is concentrated at the mean farm size.  I construct average farm size data on
eight groups for the Tofuken region: below 0.3, 0.3-0.5, 0.5-1.0, 1.0-2.0, 2.0-3.0, 3.0-5.0, 5.0-
10.0, and more than 10.0 ha farms; and seven groups for the Hokkaido region: below 0.3, 0.3-0.5,
0.5-1.0, 1.0-3.0, 3.0-5.0, 5.0-10.0, and more than 10.0 ha farms.  This data is presented in Table
3.  The farms of less than 1.0 ha in the Tofuken region account for more than 50% of all farms
and 40% of the area in rice cultivation, while farms in the Hokkaido region are larger than those in
the Tofuken region.
The Agriculture Census 1995 also reports the total area of paddies managed by each group
of farms.  Due to the acreage control program, some paddy fields are not used for rice production,
or are simply abandoned.  I define the potential area in rice cultivation as the difference between
the total area of paddies managed by farms and the total area of abandoned paddies.  I assume
this is the area of paddies which would have been used for rice production if Japan removed its
acreage control program.
Unfortunately, the acreage control program in 1994 (588,215 ha) was rather modest as a
result of the bad weather in 1993, and the area in rice cultivation could be high as input into a
simulation that assumes normal weather.  Moreover, the figures in the Agricultural Census 1995
are based on self reporting by farms and are typically underestimated compared with the area in
rice cultivation shown in Crop Statistics, which is based on a sampling measurement by statistical
officials.  Therefore, I multiply the area in rice harvest shown in the Agricultural C nsus 1995 by
1.05 in the Tofuken region, and 0.83 in the Hokkaido region, to make the area in rice harvest
consistent with the Crop Statistics data from 1992.  The year 1992 was chosen because in that
year, domestic demand and supply were almost equal.  Moreover, the acreage control program
was applied to approximately 30% of all paddy fields in Japan in the early 1990s, and former
studies in this field normally assumed that the area of total paddy field shown in the Statistics of
Cultivated Land and Planted Area would be used for the production of rice once the acreage
control program was removed.  Therefore, I multiply the data on the potential area in rice
cultivation shown in the Agricultural Census 1995 by 1.26 in the Tofuken region, and 1.25 in the
Hokkaido region, to make the total potential area in cultivation consistent with the total paddies in
Japan shown in Statistics of Cultivated Land and Planted Area (1996).  Unfortunately, the
9Agricultural Census 1995 does not group the rice farms by the slope of their paddies.  Therefore,
I simply assume the same farm size distribution for both flat agricultural areas and the rest of
Japan.
In summary, I assume that the area in rice cultivation could increase 30% if the acreage
control were removed, which makes the comparison of my result and the results of former studies
easier.  In the Tofuken region, 32.9% of paddies exist within the flat agricultural areas, and in the
Hokkaido region, all of the paddies exist within the flat agricultural areas.
C. Technology of Farms
In order to estimate the level of technology employed by farms, this study uses the Kome Seisanhi
Chosa [Survey of Rice Production Costs, hereafter KSC] data from farms selling rice between
1991 and 1994. Pre-1991 data are not used because in 1991 the KSC changed its method of
compiling statistics in several ways; it ceased to include the depreciation cost of already fully
depreciated machines, and it changed the wage used to evaluate the cost of family labor.  Data on
the Hokkaido region and the Tofuken region are prepared separately.
The KSC classifies production costs into ten categories; Seed and Seedlings, Fertilizers,
Agricultural Chemicals, Light, Heat and Power, Other Purchased Inputs, Water Resources, Rent
and Charges, Building and Land Improvement, Agricultural Implements, and Labor.  In addition,
it reports the imputed interest payments and market land rental rates, and shows the average cost
per 0.1 ha.  I have grouped average data on two regions and each region has a breakdown of
grouped average data by farm size measured by the area in rice cultivation.  To make the farm
size distribution consistent with the Agricultural Census 1995, I have averaged the data on 1.0-1.5
ha and 1.5-2.0 ha farms for the Tofuken region and the data on 1.0-1.5 ha, 1.5-2.0 ha, and 2.0-3.0
ha farms for the Hokkaido region.
I constructed several variables for the analysis.  Variable inputs, V, is the sum of the costs
of seeds, fertilizers, agricultural chemicals and other purchased materials such as soil used for the
nursery.  The cost of variable inputs is deflated by the price index, pv, onstructed from the
corresponding items in the Nouson Bukka Chingin Toukei [Rural Price and Wage Survey,
hereafter NBCT] (1990 base, transformed as 1994 = 1) with the expenditure shares as weights.
Machinery, K, is the sum of the depreciation cost of agricultural implements, rent and charges,
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deflated by pk, the price index constructed from corresponding items in the NBCT with the
expenditure shares as weights.  To be precise, the cost of agricultural implements should be
treaded as a service from the capital stock.  However, for consistency with previous studies, it is
treated as a flow variable.  Hours worked, L, is the sum of the hours worked by men and women.
Note that for women, 1 hour of actual labor is counted as 0.75 hours.  This weight comes from
the 25% differential in rural part-time wages shown in the NBCT be ween men and women during
the 1991-1994 period.  The KSC evaluates the family labor cost using the wages paid by farms
employing 5-29 persons in the construction, manufacture, transportation and telecommunication
industries obtained from the Maitsuki Kinro Tokei (Monthly Labor Statistics) with an unpublished
weight depending on the gender and age of farm workers.  Wage, PL, is me sured by dividing
labor costs by the total number of hours worked. Land, T, is the size of paddy fields used for rice
production measured in ha.  Output, y, is measured in kg of brown rice.  The price of brown rice
per kg is defined as the division of gross sales by the total output.
In this study I use only 1991-1994 data, hence it is difficult to estimate many parameters in a
translog profit function as Ito [1996] did.  Therefore, I assume that factor markets are
competitive, and use the estimates of factor shares for the production elasticity of each factor in
the Cobb-Douglas production function, Eq. ( 1 ).  The column of Actual Data Reported in the
KSC in Table 4 shows the average factor shares used in production from 1991-1994.  The factor
shares of agricultural implements (a2) and labor (a3) decrease as farm size increases in the
Tofuken and Hokkaido regions.  Furthermore, the sum of factor shares for farms with smaller
than 1 ha of area in rice cultivation exceeds one, hence those small farms are not profitable at all.
These facts may reflect a situation where small farms do not use machines efficiently.  It is also
possible that the wages for the small farms are overvalued because most of their agricultural work
is done on a part-time basis during the weekends and after non-farm work, whereas the KSC
imputes full-time wages to estimate the opportunity cost of farming as explained above.
For the sake of estimating the technology in the flat agricultural areas, since I am interested
in a situation where the farmland market works and the technology used by small farms is similar
to that used by larger farms, I assume that the same technology is used by all 0-2 ha farms (0-3 ha
farms in the Hokkaido region).  This assumption is based on the following evidence.  First,
according to The Current Situation of Japanese Farmland, once the size of a paddy field becomes
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more than 0.3 ha, the farmland market starts working because it is then easier to use larger
machines efficiently.  According to the Whi e Paper on Agriculture (1996), by consolidating
smaller paddies into a paddy larger than 0.3 ha, the time worked in 0.1 ha of paddy was reduced to
33 hours a year on average -- approximately the same number of hours worked during a year on
the farms with 1-2 ha of area in rice cultivation.  Hence, I assume that in the flat agricultural areas,
the factor shares of farms smaller than 1 ha are the same as those of 1-2 ha farms in the Tofuken
region (1-3 ha farms in the Hokkaido region) as shown in the rows of “techn logy 1” in Table 4.
To estimate efficiency parameter A, I adjusted the amount of inputs used by 0-1 ha farms so that
they are proportional to those of 1-2 ha farm.  I estimate A from Eq. ( 1 ) using 1994 data on
output, y.  The effect of weather is taken into account using the output index shown in
Sakumotsu Toukei [Produce Statistics].  For the Hokkaido region, farms with less than 1.0 ha in
rice production are assigned 1991 quantity data at 1994 prices because 1992 and 1994 data on
those farms are not available and 1993 data seem to be affected by bad weather.  All others are
assigned 1994 price and quantity data.
As an estimate of the level of technology used by the farms in the rest of Japan, Eq. ( 8 ), I
use the value of a1 reported in the KSC, because there are no substantial differences in a1 a ross
farm size.  The estimates of A are shown in the row labeled “Farms in the Rest of Japan” in Table
4.
Note that the market rent reported in the KSC stands the risk of being underestimated
because it reflects the standard rent suggested by the local Agricultural Council.  Therefore I will
report the results of simulations which set a4 equal to 0.4 for farms larger than 2 ha in the Tofuken
region and farms larger than 5 ha in the Hokkaido region, and assumes technology 1 is used by the
other smaller farms in the flat agricultural areas.  The 0.4 figure is based on Fujiki’s [1993]
estimation of a Cobb-Douglas production function using 1981-1990 data on farms larger than 1.5
ha in size, and other Japanese studies discussed in Fujiki [1993].  The values for A in this special
case are shown in the row labeled “Technology 2” in Table 4.
One might expect that technological progress will be induced by the consolidation of smaller
paddies into a large paddy in the flat agricultural areas.  Indeed, according to The Cur ent
Situation of Japanese Farmland, once all of paddy fields become larger than 0.3 ha, the time
worked per 0.1 ha of paddy could be only 17.5 hours a year, which is almost the same as on farms
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larger than 10 ha.  To capture such a situation, I assume that all farms in the flat agricultural areas
can use technology with the same factor shares of production as farms with more than 10 ha,
although the efficiency parameter A may differ.  To estimate efficiency parameter A, I adjusted
the amount of inputs attributed to 0-10 ha farms so that they are proportional to those of 10+ ha
farms.  The values for A in this case are shown in the row labeled “Technology 3” in Table 4.
C. Demand for Rice
I assume that the Japanese aggregate demand for rice has a constant own-price elasticity of -0.13
following Kako, Gemma and Ito [1997], and passes through the point where price equals 307
yen/kg (the average sales price in the Tofuken region in the 1994 KSC) and domestic consumption
equals 10,220,000 tons (the total domestic consumption in 1994).  I assume that the rice
produced in the Tofuken region and in the Hokkaido region are close substitutes and that the price
of rice produced in the Hokkaido region is always 15.52% below that of rice produced in the
Tofuken region based on the 1994 KSC.  Hence, I reduce the domestic consumption by the
weight of 1994 rice production in the Hokkaido region (8%) and the Tofuken regions (92%), and
aggregate the supply for the Hokkaido region by the weight of 0.8448.
D. Importation of Rice
Walles, Cramer, Chavez, and Hansen [1997] simulate the world rice market.  They assume that
Japan will gradually increase the importation of rice until it reaches the level of 758,000 tons of
white rice in the year 2000, as promised in the GATT Uruguay Round Agreement.  Their model
estimates that the world price of Japonica in the year 2000 will be 0.431 U.S. dollars (FOB) per 1
kg in the year 2000 based on these assumptions. According to Kome Seisaku Kenkyukai [1991],
the transportation cost from U.S. to Japan will be 0.085 $/kg.  A 6% insurance charge, a 1.2%
interest rate charge, and a commission of 3% on the shipment will be added to the sum of the
transportation cost and the price of rice.  This will make the price at the Japanese port 0.5701
$/kg, and if the exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen is 100 yen/$, the price
will be 57 yen/kg.  Finally, it costs 7 yen/kg to bring rice through Japanese customs.  In total,
neglecting the transportation cost within Japan, one can buy foreign rice at 64 yen/kg.
It is more difficult to predict to what extent rice will be imported into Japan once its rice
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market is open.  However, it is well known that the short run supply elasticities of rice in the
potential exporting countries are small, and even in the long run, they are unlikely to be greater
than one.  For example, Tyers and Anderson [1993] suppose that the supply elasticities of rice in
the U.S. and Australia, which will be the major suppliers of Japonica rice to Japan, are 0.35 and
0.2 in the short run, and 0.75 and 0.33 in the long run.  Hence, in this paper, I assume that the
importation of 758,000 tons of white rice (or 852,000 tons in brown rice units based on the
computation of Honma [1994]) at 64 yen/kg is possible since this quantity is stipulated in the
GATT Uruguay Round Agreement.  I assume further that if Japan opens its market in the year
2000, the import supply curve will start at (64 yen/kg, 852,000 tons in brown rice units), with a
Japanese domestic price elasticity of 0.3 for the inelastic case, and 1.0 for the elastic case.  I.e., I
assume that the Japanese demand for Japonica rice dictates the world price of Japonica rice.  This
is a reasonable assumption since in the year 2000, the Japanese imports of 758,000 tons of
Japonica white rice will mean that Japan will import 36% of the total world Japonica rice exports
according to the simulation of Walles, Cramer, Chavez, and Hansen [1997].
The Japanese government is likely to charge the tariff within the limits of the GATT
Uruguay Round Agreement in the year 2000, because the current import quota, known as the
minimum access approved by the Accord, is not valid after the year 2000.  So far the Japanese
government has levied a specific tax of 292 yen/kg on the minimum access importation of rice as a
mark up.  Although the Japanese government has not published the tariff equivalent regarding
rice officially, it is plausible that the current mark up, 292 yen/kg, will become the tariff level in the
year 2000.  However, the GATT Uruguay Round Accord requires Japan to reduce the amount of
the specific tax by at least 15% by the year 2000.  Therefore, the most likely specific tax in the
year 2000 is 85% of 292 yen/kg, i.e., 248 yen/kg.  I assume this specific tax will be effective on
the importation of rice after the year 2000.
IV. Simulations
A. Basic Results
The simulations try to answer the following question under a variety of circumstances: What
would happen to the Japanese rice market in the year 2000? I first show the results of simulating
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domestic equilibrium with the current acreage control program as a base line.  Second, I compare
the results of simulation with the importation of 758,000 tons of white rice as the minimum access
quota temporarily approved by the GATT Uruguay Round Accord in the year 2000, and the
importation of rice subject to a specific tax within the limits of the Accord after the removal of the
quota under the current acreage control program.  Third, I show the results of simulating
domestic equilibrium without an acreage control program, and free-import equilibrium without an
acreage control program.  In this section, I assume technology 1 is used in the flat agricultural
area.  The results of simulating Eq. ( 13 ) and Eq. ( 14 ) by changing the price of rice from 400
yen/kg to 50 yen/kg in increments of 1 yen under various assumptions are reported in Tabl  5 as
simulations A-1 through A-6.
Simulation A-1 determines the market equilibrium under the acreage controls without
imports. It predicts an equilibrium price of 327 yen/kg, and an equilibrium rent of 266,400 yen/ha
in the Tofuken region and 321,400 yen/ha in the Hokkaido region.  The predictions are close to
the actual figures from 1994: the price of rice was 307 yen/kg, and the rent was 282,800 yen/ha in
the Tofuken region and 257,800 yen/ha in the Hokkaido region.  The aggregate supply function
for rice exhibits a price elasticity of supply of 0.461 as shown in the row labeled A-1 in Table 6,
which is consistent with a long run price elasticity of supply of 0.4 as assumed in Honma [1994]
and Oga [1998].  However, the aggregate supply elasticity obtained in this paper is a weighted
average of price elasticities of supply in the rest of Japan (As21 in Eq. ( 13 )), 0.186, and that in the
flat agricultural areas (As11+As12 in Eq. ( 13 )), 1.571.
Simulation A-2 considers the effect if 852,000 tons of imported brown rice, which are
equivalent to the 758,000 tons of white rice based on the computation of Honma [1994], are
supplied in the Japanese rice market as a perfect substitute for Japanese rice under the acreage
control program.  It predicts an equilibrium rice price of 296 yen/kg as can be seen in Table5.
Given the fact that the current price of rice is 307 yen/kg, the effect of the minimum access reduces
the price of rice by only 4%.
Simulation A-3 examines the case where the Japanese government levies a 248 yen/kg
specific tax on foreign supply, which has a price elasticity of supply of 1.0.  The price of rice
becomes 298 yen/kg, and domestic supply increases slightly compared with the result of simulation
A-2.  Therefore, for the sake of protecting domestic production, the tariff is marginally effective
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compared with the minimum access to be accepted in the year 2000.  However, the choice of
tariff or quota does not alter the nature of equilibrium as long as acreage controls are given.  I do
not report the results of simulations assuming that the foreign price elasticity of supply is 0.3, since
the results are not sensitive to the elasticity of the foreign supply curve as long as the specific tax
of 248 yen/kg is essentially prohibitive.
Simulation A-4 considers the removal of the acreage control program by simulating the
supply functions with acreage equal to the potential area in rice cultivation. It predicts an
equilibrium price of 236 yen/kg (a 28% reduction relative to the results of simulation A-1).  Note
that the equilibrium rent falls approximately 65% compared with the results of simulation A-1 in
both regions.  Although the equilibrium price of rice falls substantially, the aggregate supply
elasticity of rice is 0.439, which is close to that of simulation A-1 as reported in T ble 6.  H nce,
as can be seen in Figure 1, the shift in the aggregate supply curve from A-1 to A-4 due to the
removal of acreage control seems to be parallel.
Simulation A-5 examines the effect of removing acreage controls with an import elasticity of
0.3.  The price of rice will be 195 yen/kg (a 36% reduction in the rice price compared with the
1994 price) and 11% of the Japanese rice market will be occupied by foreign suppliers.  In the
mean time, rents fall about 80% in both regions compared with the rents in 1994.
Simulation A-6 assumes an import elasticity of 1.0.  The price of rice will be 161 yen/kg (a
48% reduction in the rice price compared with the 1994 price) and 20% of the Japanese rice
market will be occupied by foreign suppliers.  The level of rents decrease about 80% in both
regions compared with the rents in 1994.
To quantify the dead weight loss and welfare gains to the consumers due to the current
protection of domestically produced rice, Figure 2 is useful.  Once the acreage control is removed,
the equilibrium price of rice is 236 yen/kg, the supply curve shifts from A-1 to A-4, and the
domestic equilibrium shifts from point A to point E.  Therefore, with free importation from
producers whose price elasticity of supply is 1.0, the dead weight loss is approximated by the area
of triangle EDC in Figure 2, (236-161)*(10773 - 8591)/2 = 81,825 million Japanese yen.  The
loss is about 0.01 percent of the Japanese nominal GDP in 1995.
However, with acreage control program, the supply curve of simulation A-1 passes the
output of 6,538,000 tons if the price of rice is 161 yen/kg (point B in Figure 2).  If we evaluate
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the dead weight loss including the effect of acreage controls, the loss will be approximated by the
area of triangle ABC in F gure 2, (327-161)*(10773-6538)/2 = 351,505 million Japanese yen,
which is about 4.3 times larger than the efficiency losses after the removal of acreage control
program.  The result clearly demonstrates that most of the efficiency gains come from the
removal of acreage controls, rather than from rice imports, if the Japanese government abolishes
the acreage controls and allows the free importation of rice.
It is not surprising that the dead weight loss is relatively small because the price elasticity of
demand for rice is small.  However, the shift from point A to point E increases consumer surplus
by 911,638 million Japanese yen, and the change from point A to point C indeed increases
consumer surplus by 1,708,140 million Japanese yen (0.3% of the 1995 Japanese nominal GDP).
Therefore, the potential gains for the Japanese consumers from the free importation of rice are
very large despite the fact the dead weight loss is small.
The rows labeled A-1 through A-6 in Tables 7 and 8 report the equilibrium farm size in the
flat agricultural areas in the Tofuken region and the Hokkaido region respectively.  The results of
simulation A-1 show a farmland concentration toward farms larger than 2 ha in the Tofuken region,
farms larger than 10 ha in the Hokkaido region, and farms smaller than 0.3 ha in all of Japan.
This result reflects the cross-sectional differences in the human capital and factor shares used in
production.  Note that larger values of a4 and smaller values of q  = a1+a2+a3+a4 result in
changes in the optimal farm size that are more than in proportion to the changes in the value of A
(see Eq. ( 7 )) for those farms shown in Table 4 given factor prices and the price of rice.
The results of simulations A-2 and A-3 show that with the small decrease in the equilibrium
price of rice relative to simulation A-1, a concentration of farmland towards larger farms occurs.
This reallocation of farmland is explained by the differences in the factor shares of production
across farm size.  For example, from simulation A-1 to simulation A-2, the price of rice falls 10%,
and the rent in the Tofuken region falls 21%.  Note that Eq. ( 7 ) shows that the percentage
change in the optimal farm size as a result of changes in the prices of rice and rent is (1/1-q ) $p
+{1+ (a4/1-q )} $pT , where ^ denotes the percentage change.  Note also in Tabl 4, that the values
of (1/1-q ) and {1+(a4/1-q )} for farms larger than 10 ha in the Tofuken region are 3.05 and 1.62,
whereas those of farms smaller than 1 ha are 6.84 and 2 respectively.  Since the total supply of
farmland in the flat agricultural areas is fixed, the increase in the farm size of some groups must
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result in a decrease in the farm size of the other groups.  Because the rent falls more than the
price of rice, it is evident that the size of larger farms is increasing while the size of smaller farms is
decreasing.
It is likely that the Japanese government will maintain the acreage control program even
after the year 2000, making the results of simulation A-3 may perhaps the most plausible.  The
findings indicate that the importation of rice under a specific tariff barely affects the structure of
Japanese rice production, and it slightly induces middle sized farmers to rent their farmland to the
large-scale farmers.
Simulation A-4 demonstrates that with the removal of acreage controls, the optimal farm
size increases compared to the potential area in cultivation for the farms larger than 2 ha in the
Tofuken region, and farms larger than 10 ha in the Hokkaido region for the same reason as
explained above.  The results of simulations A-5 and A-6 show that under the free importation of
rice, the concentration toward larger farms becomes evident compared with the results of
simulation A-4.  For example, farms larger than size 10 ha have an average equilibrium size of 44
ha and 55 ha in the Tofuken region, and 27 ha in the Hokkaido region.
The rows labeled A-1 to A-6 in Table 9 and Table 10 report the equilibrium farm income in
the flat agricultural areas of the Tofuken region and the Hokkaido region respectively.  The
definition of farm income is as follows:
Farm Income p y a a a a p Family Labor pi i L T  own landº - - - - + × + ×. ( )1 1 2 3 4 . (  15  )
Measures of farm income are common among Japanese statistical sources such as the Nouka
Keizai Cyosa (1994) [Survey of Farm Households].  Values from this source are reported in the
first three rows of Table 9.  Unfortunately income data for the Hokkaido region are not available.
Note that for farms of less than 5.0 ha, farm income is lower than non-farm income.  In particular,
farms of less than 0.5 ha depend exclusively on non-farm income as well as pensions.  This is
because in the typical, small rice-producing farms in Japan, young laborers are employees, and old
and female laborers work in the paddy mainly for their own household consumption, they are just
waiting for the chance to convert their paddies for non-agricultural purposes.
For the sake of comparison, I report the farm income obtained from rice production shown in
the 1994 KSC.  One should note that the farm income of 0.3-0.5 ha farms in Nouka Keizai Cyosa
(1994) is substantially lower than that reported in the 1994 KSC.  This could reflect a bias
18
because the KSC tends to pick up more profitable farms.
Table 9 shows that simulation A-1 approximates the income of farms larger than 1 ha
reasonably well, while farms smaller than 1 ha increase their farm income because their efficiency
in rice production improves substantially under the assumption of technology 1.
For the sake of clarification, the composition of the 493,000 yen of farm income for 0.3-0.5
ha farms in the Tofuken region is as follows.  First, note that since the area in rice cultivation and
the optimal farm size are almost the same as we have seen in T bl  7, the term relating to rent is
negligible in Eq. ( 15 ).  Therefore, the income could be the sum of two terms, p y a ai. ( )1 1 2- -
and ( . )p Family Labor p y aL i× - 3 .  Note also that 242,000 yen of income as reported in the 1994
KSC is almost equal top y a ai. ( )1 1 2- - .  The reason for this is illustrated in Table 1, where we
see that 0.3-0.5 ha farms are using solely family labor, hence ( . )p Family Labor p y aL i× - 3  is almost
zero.  In simulation A-1, by assuming technology 1, the sales net of V and K, orp y a ai. ( )1 1 2- - ,
become about 1.6 times higher than those computed in the KSC.  This reflects the lower values of
a1 and a2, changes in the price of rice from 307 yen/kg to 327 yen/kg, and the decrease in the yield
per area.  Net sales are thus roughly 400,000 yen.  Regarding the term
( . )p Family Labor p y aL i× - 3 , technology 1 reduces the amount of family labor used on 0.3-0.5 ha
farms by 40% compared with the amount reported in the KSC, whic  adds another 100,000 yen of
farm income.  Therefore, the farm income of 0.3-0.5 ha farms becomes close to 500,000 yen.
Note that for the small farms, the savings on family labor typically account for 100,000-200,000
yen of farm income in simulations A-1, A-2 and A-3.
The results of simulations A-2 and A-3 predict relatively small decreases in farm income
compared with the results of simulation A-1.  The results of simulation A-4 suggest that by
removing the acreage control program, the decrease in the price of rice and rent will reduce farm
incomes relative to the results of simulation A-1.  The results of simulation A-6 primarily predict
that farms larger than 1 ha will suffer 30-50 % losses in their farm incomes compared with
simulation A-1.  Therefore, large-scale farming in the presence of the free trade of rice may not
be profitable enough as long as we are using the current level of technology.
B. Sensitivity Analysis Regarding the Choice of Technology Parameters
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Technology 2 sets a4 equal to 0.4 for farms larger than 2 ha in the Tofuken region and farms larger
than 5 ha in the Hokkaido region.  This assumption is based on the uncertainty about whether the
market rent reported in the KSC is underestimated, because it reflects the standard rent suggested
by the local Agricultural Council.  The results of simulating Eq. ( 13 ) and Eq. ( 14 ) by changing
the price of rice from 400 yen/kg to 50 yen/kg in increments of 1 yen, under the assumption that
technology 2 is used by the farms, are reported in Table 5 as simulations B-1 through B-6.
Simulation B-1 determines the market equilibrium under the current acreage controls
without imports. It predicts an equilibrium price of 317 yen/kg, and an equilibrium rent of 532,500
yen/ha in the Tofuken region and 537,900 yen/ha in the Hokkaido region.  Although the price of
rice decreases 3% compared with the result of simulation A-1, the equilibrium rent is doubled in
the Tofuken region and increases 67% in the Hokkaido region reflecting the higher marginal
productivity of land on the larger farms, which increases the demand for farmland and increases the
equilibrium rent.  Because the aggregate supply function of rice exhibits a price elasticity of
supply of 0.452 as shown in the row labeled B-1 in Table 6, it is natural that almost all of the
aggregate supply figures are same as those reported in the results of simulation A-1.
Simulations B-2 and B-3 predict about a 3-4 % reduction in the price of rice, a more than
100% increase in the rent in the Tofuken region, and a 65-68% rent increase in the Hokkaido
region compared with the results of simulations A-2 and A-3.
Simulation B-4 considers the removal of the acreage control program by simulating the
supply functions with acreage equal to the potential area in rice cultivation. It predicts an
equilibrium price of 210 yen/kg (a 11% reduction relative to the results of simulation A-4).
Although the equilibrium price of rice falls substantially, the aggregate supply elasticity of rice is
0.451, and it is not so much different from those used in simulation B-1 as reported in Table 6.
Again, the rent increases substantially in both regions relative to the results of simulation A-2.
Figure 1 captures the shift of supply curves from A-2 to B-4 reflecting technical change.
Simulations B-5 and B-6 show about a 10% reduction in the rice price compared with the
results of simulations A-5 and A-6, while the rent increases further.  The rows labeled B-1
through B-6 in Tables 7 and 8 report the equilibrium farm size in the flat agricultural areas in the
Tofuken region and the Hokkaido region respectively.  The results of simulations show that
farms of less than 1 ha in the Tofuken region and farms of less than 5 ha in the Hokkaido region
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essentially cease the production of rice, since the optimal farm size of less than 0.5 ha normally
means that farms produce rice for their own family consumption.
Because of the higher productivity of larger farms, 2-3 ha farms and 3-5 ha farms in the
Tofuken region make their optimal farm size 2-4 times larger compared with the corresponding
results of simulations A-1 through A-6.  In the Hokkaido region, farmland concentration occurs
towards farms of more than 10 ha in simulations B-1 through B-6.
The rows labeled B-1 through B-6 in Tables 9 and 10 report the equilibrium farm income in
the flat agricultural areas of the Tofuken region and those of the Hokkaido region respectively.
Readers might wonder why the income of farmers smaller than 2 ha in the Tofuken region and
smaller than 5 ha in the Hokkaido increased 4-15 % compared with simulations A-1 through A-6.
This is because those farms essentially exited from the production of rice while enjoying higher
rent payments from the larger farms, and saving almost all of their family labor.  On the contrary,
the income of farms larger than 5 ha in the Hokkaido region experienced a 2-13% decrease
compared with the results of simulations A-1 through A-6, and the 2-3 ha farms and 5-10 ha farms
in the Tofuken region suffer a 2-7% loss in farm income compared with the results of simulations
A-1 through A-6.
To sum up, an increase in the value of a4 for the larger farms reduces the equilibrium price
of rice only 3-10%, while it increases the level of rent substantially compared with the results of
simulations assuming technology 1.  Higher land rental rates and lower rice prices induce small
scale farm owners to become landlords.  The income of smaller farms generally increases because
they can save family labor and earn more rent, but the large-scale farms do not necessarily receive
an increase in their farm income.
Regarding technology 3, which assumes the technology of larger farms in the flat agricultural
areas is available to all farms in the flat agricultural areas given the differences in the human capital
across farm size, the simulations are of limited interest since it presumes more investment in the
farmland consolidation program.  Therefore, I restrict my attention to only the cases where the
acreage control program is removed, and the Japanese farmland market is liberalized.
The results of simulating Eq. ( 13 ) and Eq. ( 14 ) by changing the price of rice from 400
yen/kg to 50 yen/kg in increments of 1 yen, under the assumptions that the acreage control
program is removed and free importation is allowed, are reported in Table 5 as simulations C-4,
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C-5 and C-6.  The equilibrium price of rice falls 14-17% compared with simulations A-4, A-5 and
A-6 respectively.  The results of simulation C-4 shows that with equal factor shares across farm
size, farmland now concentrates towards middle sized farms relative to the results of simulations
A-4, A-5 and A-6 given the differences in human capital.  The results suggest that  technical
change and larger scale operation are not always consistent, although the Japanese government
regards large-scale tenant farming using faster and better machines as the most promising style of
rice production in order to achieve lower rice prices.  It is efficient to use better technology, as
can be seen in the reduction in the price of rice compared with the results of A-4.  However, once
all farms can use the same technology up to the factor share of production, the concentration of
farmland towards large-scale farms does not result from a decrease in the price of rice and rent
given the human capital, A.  Such results are consistent with the experience of Taiwan shown in
Fujiki [1997], where the efficient production of rice was achieved based on  contract farming
given the prevalence of small-scale, part-time farms.  Because all farms use  the same factor
share of production, the relative farm sizes are determined by the relative size of A alone, and the
changes in the price of rice and rent do not alter the equilibrium allocation of farmland.
Therefore, the optimal farm size reported in the results of simulations C-4, C-5 and C-6 are
identical.
Of course, reflecting the changes in the price of rice and rents, farm incomes do change as
can be seen in the rows labeled C-4, C-5 and C-6 in Tables 9 and 10.  As expected, farms smaller
than 3 ha in the Tofuken region and farms smaller than 5 ha in the Hokkaido region receive an
increase in their farm income compared with the results of simulations A-4, A-5 and A-6, because
their productive efficiency in improve further, despite the reduction in the price of rice.  The
farms smaller than 0.3 ha in the Hokkaido region is the exception, because an increase in their
gross sales is dominated by the decrease in the savings on family labor and rent payments from the
larger farms.  Nonetheless, farms with relatively large size again experience a decrease in their
farm income due to the reduction in the price of rice.
C. Wider Flat Agricultural Area
In this section, I assume technology 1 is used in the flat agricultural areas once again, but I assume
that 0.421% of the farmland in the Tofuken region can be treated as flat agricultural area.  This
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assumption means that the farmland market works in all of the paddies larger than 0.3 ha in the
Agricultural Promotion Area irrespective of the slope of paddies as shown in row D of Table 2.
The results of simulating Eq. ( 11 ) and Eq. ( 12 ) by changing the price of rice from 400 yen/kg to
50 yen/kg in increments of 1 yen, under various assumptions about the acreage control program
and imports, are reported in Table 5 as simulations D-1 through D-6.
Compared with simulations A-1 through A-3, the results of simulations D-1 through D-3
imply that the price of rice is almost unchanged and the rent increases by at most 5%.  Without
acreage controls (simulations D-4, D-5, and D-6), the price of rice increases 7-11%, and the rent
increases 18-31% compared with the results of simulations A-4, A-5 and A-6.
The rows labeled D-1 through D-6 in Tables 7 and 8 report the equilibrium farm size in the
flat agricultural areas in the Tofuken region and the Hokkaido region respectively.  The results of
simulations D-1 through D-6 show that the optimal size of farms larger than 2 ha in the Tofuken
region and farms larger than 5 ha in the Hokkaido region decreased compared with the results of
simulations A-1 through A-6.  The results indicate that the increase in the number of price elastic
suppliers makes the aggregate supply curve more elastic (with a supply elasticity of 0.515 in the
case of D-4 in Table 6).  Therefore, there is a moderate decrease in aggregate supply given the
same price of rice because more farms respond to the higher land rental rates, as can be seen in the
shift of the supply curve from A-4 to D-4 in Figure 1.  It is true that the total supply of flat areas
increases.  However, the rent increases by more than price of rice, making the optimal size of
larger farms decrease while the optimal size of smaller farms increases compared with the results
of simulations A-1 through A-6.
The rows labeled D-1 through D-6 in Tables 9 and 10 report the equilibrium farm income in
the flat agricultural areas of the Tofuken region and the Hokkaido region respectively.  It is
evident that, reflecting the small increase in the price of rice compared with simulations A-1
through A-6, the equilibrium farm income increases.
V. Summary and Conclusion
The results of this study suggest that under the right conditions, a relaxation of trade barriers
in the Japanese rice market would have only a minor adverse effect on Japanese rice-producing
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farms.  If Japan imports rice under a specific tax of 248 yen/kg, as might be the case in the year
2000, the results of simulation A-3 imply that the structure of Japanese rice production would
barely be affected.  These findings are based on the assumption that the Japanese farmland market
works reasonably well in the flat agricultural areas, where small, irregularly shaped paddies can be
consolidated into paddies larger than 0.3 ha in size, and the efficient use of machinery becomes
possible.
For the sake of protecting domestic production, a tariff set within the limits of the GATT
Uruguay Round Accord would be more effective than the minimum access import quota currently
accepted by the Japanese government (simulation A-2 versus simulation A-3).
If the current acreage control program is removed, there will be large-scale farms in
equilibrium despite the 30% reductions in the price of rice caused by the removal of acreage
controls (simulation A-4).  The reduction of rice price and rents will cause structural changes in
the farm size distribution reflecting the differences in the efficiency parameters and human capital
levels across farm size, and large-scale tenant farming will prevail in the flat agricultural areas,
although the farm income of larger farms will be reduced substantially in such a situation.
While the dead weight loss due to the import ban is relatively small given the inelastic
demand for rice (Figure 2), potential gains in consumer surplus due to the free importation of rice
could be 0.3 % of the Japanese GDP, because the price of rice could be halved (simulation A-6).
Those results are not sensitive to the increase in the percentage of flat agricultural areas in the
Tofuken region from 33% to 42% (simulations D-1 to D-6).
The increase in the value of a4 f r the larger farms will reduce the equilibrium price of rice
by 3-10 %, while increasing the level of competitive rental substantially compared with the results
of the simulations summarized above.  This technology shock does induce further the structural
changes in the farm size distribution (simulations B-1 through B-6).
Once all farms can share the same productivity parameters as those of large-scale farms, the
differences in human capital alone will not induce further structural changes in the farm size
distribution as the result of changes in the price of rice and rent, despite improved production
efficiency.  Such results are consistent with the experience of Taiwan discussed in Fujiki [1997],
where the efficient production of rice based on contract farming, given the prevalence of small-
scale, part-time farmers, became possible.  Large scale tenant farming, which the Japanese
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government has been aiming for since 1970, is a promising way to achieve efficient production
only if there exists a substantial divergence in the technology across farm size (Simulations C-4
through C-6).
The caveat for this study is as follows. First, I do not allow farms to convert paddies.
Second, I do not allow for the possibility of entry by new organizations other than farm households.
Third, if the small-scale farms will exit from rice production due to the retirement of old farmers, it
will help to create large-scale farms.  Even with these caveats in mind, I believe that the model
discussed here should be a useful building block for the sake of policy recommendations and
welfare evaluation, because it forecasts the endogenous farm size distribution, rent, and price of
rice, and it discusses the interaction between the farmland market and the rice market explicitly.
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Table  1 :   Percentage  o f  Fami ly  Labor  and Owner-Ti l l er  Cul t ivat ion
Tofuken Region, Farm Size (ha) 0-0.3 0.3-0.5 0.5-1.0 1.0-2.0 2.0-3.0 3.0-5.0 5.0-10.0 10.0+
Percentage of Family Labor 98.1 98.8 98.9 97.2 98.1 97.6 97.1 95.7
Percentage of Own Land 96.7 92.6 88.9 86.8 80.8 65 50.3 35.6
Hokkaido Region, Farm Size (ha) 0-0.3 0.3-0.5 0.5-1.0 1.0-3.0 3.0-5.0 5.0-10.0 10.0+
Percentage of Family Labor 97.2 98.8 99.1 96.6 93.5 98.3 95.9
Percentage of Own Land 94.5 93.1 89.7 85.7 89.7 92.3 76.2
Source: The Kome Seisanhi Chosa [Survey of Rice Production Costs] 1994. Data on 0-0.3, 0.3-0.5, and 0.5-1.0 ha
farms in the Hokkaido region are obtained from the 1993 survey.
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Table  2： Flat  Agr icul tura l  Areas
HokkaidoTofuken
(A) Total Paddy Field (1000 ha) 241 2541
(B) Paddies Larger Than 0.3 ha 215 1209
(B/A) 0.892 0.475
Within Agriculture Promotion Area
(C) Total Paddy Field (1000 ha) 234 1965
(D) Paddies Larger Than 0.3 ha 209 1069
(D/A) 0.869 0.421
Within Agriculture Promotion Area, Slope Less Than 1/100
(E) Total Paddy Field (1000 ha) 208 1383
(F) Paddies Larger Than 0.3 ha 189 836
(F/A) 0.786 0.329
Source: The Current Situation of Japanese Farmland, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 1994.
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Table  3 :  Japanese  Rice -Produc ing  Farm S ize  Dis tr ibut ion
Tofuken Region, Farm Size (ha) 0-0.3 0.3-0.5 0.5-1.0 1.0-2.0 2.0-3.0 3.0-5.0 5.0-10.0 10.0+ Total
 Farms 427186 598550 691255 388289 99199 46993 12707 2023 2266202
(%) 18.9 26.4 30.5 17.1 4.4 2.1 0.6 0.1
Area in Rice Production (ha) 83078 220122 465211 513477 230642 168872 78927 28390 1788719
(% of Total Area in Production) 4.6 11.1 23.4 25.8 11.6 8.5 4.0 1.4
Hokkaido Region, Farm Size (ha) 0-0.3 0.3-0.5 0.5-1.0 1.0-3.0 3.0-5.0 5.0-10.0 10.0+ Total
 Farms 765 1303 2152 6846 7078 11656 4346 34146
(%) 2.2 3.8 6.3 20.0 20.7 34.1 12.7
Area in Rice Production (ha) 139 444 1383 12292 25940 77116 53382 170696
(% of Total Area in Production) 0.1 0.3 0.8 7.2 15.2 45.2 31.3
Source: The Agricultural Census 1995.
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Table  4 :  Factor  Shares  in  Rice  Product ion
Tofuken Region, Farm Size (ha) 0-0.3 0.3-0.5 0.5-1.0 1.0-2.0 2.0-3.0 3.0-5.0 5.0-10.0 10.0+
Actual Data Reported in the KSC
a1 0.191 0.191 0.169 0.144 0.137 0.136 0.137 0.144
a2 0.355 0.311 0.279 0.218 0.186 0.169 0.154 0.154
a3 0.529 0.485 0.425 0.325 0.257 0.234 0.205 0.170
a4 0.143 0.132 0.153 0.166 0.182 0.193 0.221 0.203
a1+a2+a3+a4 1.219 1.120 1.027 0.855 0.763 0.733 0.719 0.673
Technology 1
a1 0.144 0.144 0.144 0.144 0.137 0.136 0.137 0.144
a2 0.218 0.218 0.218 0.218 0.186 0.169 0.154 0.154
a3 0.325 0.325 0.325 0.325 0.257 0.234 0.205 0.170
a4 0.166 0.166 0.166 0.166 0.182 0.193 0.221 0.203
A 2.939 3.065 3.327 3.692 10.751 17.738 26.340 43.874
Technology 2
a1 0.144 0.144 0.144 0.144 0.137 0.136 0.137 0.144
a2 0.218 0.218 0.218 0.218 0.186 0.169 0.154 0.154
a3 0.325 0.325 0.325 0.325 0.257 0.234 0.205 0.170
a4 0.166 0.166 0.166 0.166 0.400 0.400 0.400 0.400
A 2.939 3.065 3.327 3.692 3.253 5.209 8.310 10.866
Technology 3
a1 0.144 0.144 0.144 0.144 0.144 0.144 0.144 0.144
a2 0.154 0.154 0.154 0.154 0.154 0.154 0.154 0.154
a3 0.170 0.170 0.170 0.170 0.170 0.170 0.170 0.170
a4 0.203 0.203 0.203 0.203 0.203 0.203 0.203 0.203
A 12.702 14.390 17.431 21.999 26.935 31.558 36.940 44.502
Farms in the Rest of Japan
a1 0.191 0.191 0.169 0.145 0.137 0.137 0.138 0.144
A 10.862 10.610 12.844 15.986 17.598 17.823 17.285 16.158
Hokkaido Region, Farm Size (ha) 0-0.3 0.3-0.5 0.5-1.0 1.0-3.0 3.0-5.0 5.0-10.0 10.0+
Actual Data Reported in the KSC
a1 0.198 0.195 0.173 0.152 0.157 0.137 0.168
a2 0.369 0.314 0.289 0.210 0.218 0.152 0.171
a3 0.520 0.496 0.435 0.316 0.312 0.234 0.224
a4 0.150 0.143 0.159 0.136 0.179 0.178 0.216
a1+a2+a3+a4 1.236 1.147 1.056 0.813 0.867 0.701 0.780
Technology 1
a1 0.152 0.152 0.152 0.152 0.157 0.137 0.168
a2 0.210 0.210 0.210 0.210 0.218 0.152 0.171
a3 0.316 0.316 0.316 0.316 0.312 0.234 0.224
a4 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.179 0.178 0.216
A 4.180 4.316 4.819 5.811 4.156 32.742 15.497
Technology 2
a1 0.152 0.152 0.152 0.152 0.157 0.137 0.168
a2 0.210 0.210 0.210 0.210 0.218 0.152 0.171
a3 0.316 0.316 0.316 0.316 0.312 0.234 0.224
a4 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.179 0.400 0.400
A 4.180 4.316 4.819 5.811 4.156 7.567 4.134
Technology 3
a1 0.168 0.168 0.168 0.168 0.168 0.168 0.168
a2 0.171 0.171 0.171 0.171 0.171 0.171 0.171
a3 0.224 0.224 0.224 0.224 0.224 0.224 0.224
a4 0.216 0.216 0.216 0.216 0.216 0.216 0.216
A 6.647 6.963 7.932 9.877 12.380 13.957 15.580
Source: The Kome Seisanhi Chosa [Survey of Rice Production Costs] 1991-1994.
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Table  5 :  Equi l ibr ium Pr ice ,  Rent ,  and  Domest i c  Supply
Simulation Acreage Import Tariff P PT (yen/ha) Ds Dd Ds/Dd
Controls Elasticity (yen/kg) (yen/kg) Tofuken Hokkaido(1000 ton)(1000 ton) (%)
A-1 Yes 327 266,400321,400 9,807 9,807 100
A-2 Yes 0 Min Ac. 296 199,900253,400 9,093 9,953 91
A-3 Yes 1 248 298 203,800257,500 9,138 9,944 92
A-4 No 236 91,100 105,600 10,229 10,229 100
A-5 No 0.3 0 195 54,200 67,900 9,307 10,508 89
A-6 No 1 0 161 32,900 43,900 8,591 10,773 80
B-1 Yes 317 532,500537,900 9,838 9,838 100
B-2 Yes 0 Min Ac. 284 411,000419,700 9,145 10,006 91
B-3 Yes 1 248 288 424,700433,200 9,229 9,988 92
B-4 No 210 198,700199,300 10,377 10,377 92
B-5 No 0.3 0 174 128,800130,800 9,496 10,664 89
B-6 No 1 0 148 89,100 91,200 8,888 10,891 82
C-4 No 202 111,700 97,500 10,452 10,452 100
C-5 No 0.3 0 162 73,700 58,800 9,610 10,764 89
C-6 No 1 0 139 55,300 41,400 9,094 10,980 83
D-1 Yes 329 271,200326,100 9,810 9,810 100
D-2 Yes 0 Min Ac. 302 211,700265,800 9,070 9,927 91
D-3 Yes 1 248 303 213,800267,900 9,096 9,922 92
D-4 No 254 111,800125,500 10,137 10,137 100
D-5 No 0.3 0 216 71,500 86,000 9,128 10,369 88
D-6 No 1 0 179 43,300 55,900 8,241 10,625 78
Note: Ds is domestic supply, Dd is domestic demand, Min Ac. is minimum access import quota of 852,000 tons of
brown rice.
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Table  6： Price  Elas t i c i ty  o f  Supply  o f  Rice
Simulation Aggregate The Flat The Rest of 
Supply Agricultural Areas Japan
A-1 0.461 1.571 0.186
A-4 0.439 1.577 0.187
B-1 0.452 1.349 0.186
B-4 0.451 1.340 0.187
C-4 0.374 0.960 0.187
D-1 0.543 1.586 0.186
D-4 0.515 1.592 0.187
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Table  7： Equi l ibr ium Average  Farm Size  (ha)  in  the  F la t  Agr icu l tura l
Areas  in  the  Tofuken  Reg ion
Tofuken, Farm Size (ha) 0-0.3 0.3-0.5 0.5-1.0 1.0-2.0 2.0-3.0 3.0-5.0 5.0-10.0 10.0+
Area in Rice Cultivation (ha) 0.205 0.387 0.709 1.393 2.450 3.786 6.544 14.785
Simulation P PT
A-1 327 266,400 0.266 0.373 0.614 1.206 2.628 4.889 10.371 16.263
A-2 296 199,900 0.248 0.348 0.572 1.124 2.868 5.521 12.160 19.110
A-3 298 203,800 0.249 0.350 0.575 1.130 2.852 5.477 12.032 18.905
Potential Area in Rice Cultivation (ha)0.318 0.522 0.951 1.846 3.212 4.950 8.569 19.302
Simulation P PT
A-4 236 91,100 0.281 0.395 0.649 1.276 4.427 9.151 22.147 34.205
A-5 195 54,200 0.230 0.323 0.531 1.043 4.956 10.951 28.422 44.311
A-6 161 32,900 0.179 0.252 0.414 0.813 5.338 12.624 35.091 55.434
Area in Rice Cultivation (ha) 0.205 0.387 0.709 1.393 2.450 3.786 6.544 14.785
Simulation P PT
B-1 317 532,500 0.048 0.068 0.112 0.219 10.287 9.891 10.530 18.561
B-2 284 411,000 0.039 0.055 0.091 0.179 9.551 11.526 12.824 22.909
B-3 288 424,700 0.040 0.057 0.094 0.184 9.676 11.318 12.516 22.318
Potential Area in Rice Cultivation (ha)0.318 0.522 0.951 1.846 3.212 4.950 8.569 19.302
Simulation P PT
B-4 210 198,700 0.023 0.033 0.054 0.106 10.986 19.783 23.785 43.506
B-5 174 128,800 0.016 0.023 0.038 0.074 7.844 23.888 31.799 59.995
B-6 148 89,100 0.012 0.016 0.027 0.053 5.302 27.117 39.913 77.641
Potential Area in Rice Cultivation (ha)0.318 0.522 0.951 1.846 3.212 4.950 8.569 19.302
Simulation P PT
C-4 202 111,700 0.341 0.505 0.893 1.801 3.449 5.664 9.155 15.949
C-5 162 73,700 0.341 0.505 0.893 1.800 3.449 5.663 9.153 15.945
C-6 139 55,300 0.340 0.504 0.891 1.796 3.441 5.650 9.132 15.908
Area in Rice Cultivation (ha) 0.205 0.387 0.709 1.393 2.450 3.786 6.544 14.785
Simulation P PT
D-1 329 271,200 0.267 0.375 0.616 1.210 2.612 4.851 10.265 16.096
D-2 302 211,700 0.251 0.353 0.581 1.142 2.820 5.392 11.787 18.514
D-3 303 213,800 0.252 0.354 0.582 1.143 2.811 5.367 11.718 18.405
Potential Area in Rice Cultivation (ha)0.318 0.522 0.951 1.846 3.212 4.950 8.569 19.302
Simulation P PT
D-4 254 111,800 0.300 0.422 0.694 1.364 4.203 8.470 19.947 30.722
D-5 216 71,500 0.257 0.361 0.593 1.165 4.675 9.968 24.922 38.652
D-6 179 43,300 0.206 0.290 0.476 0.936 5.136 11.698 31.311 49.091
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Table  8：  Equi l ibr ium Average  Farm Size  (ha)  in  the  F la t  Agr icu l tura l
Areas  in  the  Hokkaido  Reg ion
Hokkaido, Farm Size (ha) 0-0.3 0.3-0.5 0.5-1.0 1.0-3.0 3.0-5.0 5.0-10.0 10.0+
Area in Rice Cultivation (ha) 0.136 0.254 0.481 1.343 2.741 4.949 9.188
Simulation P PT
A-1 327 321400 0.171 0.208 0.371 0.834 2.104 4.190 13.113
A-2 296 253400 0.152 0.184 0.328 0.738 1.741 4.388 13.360
A-3 298 257500 0.153 0.186 0.331 0.744 1.763 4.374 13.344
Potential Area in Rice Cultivation (ha)1.092 1.056 1.421 2.999 5.272 9.053 16.487
Simulation P PT
A-4 236 105,600 0.205 0.249 0.443 0.995 2.480 8.306 27.047
A-5 195 67,900 0.158 0.192 0.342 0.769 1.669 8.875 27.277
A-6 161 43,900 0.120 0.146 0.261 0.586 1.103 9.376 27.117
Area in Rice Cultivation (ha) 0.136 0.254 0.481 1.343 2.741 4.949 9.188
Simulation P PT
B-1 317 537,900 0.060 0.073 0.129 0.291 0.498 3.547 18.478
B-2 284 419,700 0.051 0.062 0.110 0.248 0.391 3.958 17.654
B-3 288 433,200 0.052 0.063 0.113 0.253 0.403 3.901 17.738
Potential Area in Rice Cultivation (ha)1.092 1.056 1.421 2.999 5.272 9.053 16.487
Simulation P PT
B-4 210 199,300 0.037 0.045 0.079 0.179 0.233 7.915 33.325
B-5 174 130,800 0.028 0.034 0.060 0.135 0.153 9.350 29.613
B-6 148 91,200 0.022 0.026 0.047 0.106 0.106 10.671 26.170
Potential Area in Rice Cultivation (ha)1.092 1.056 1.421 2.999 5.272 9.053 16.487
Simulation P PT
C-4 202 97,500 0.378 0.474 0.849 2.035 5.884 9.612 16.019
C-5 162 58,800 0.378 0.474 0.849 2.035 5.884 9.611 16.018
C-6 139 41,400 0.378 0.474 0.849 2.035 5.883 9.610 16.016
Area in Rice Cultivation (ha) 0.136 0.254 0.481 1.343 2.741 4.949 9.188
Simulation P PT
D-1 329 326,100 0.173 0.210 0.374 0.840 2.129 4.178 13.099
D-2 302 265,800 0.155 0.189 0.337 0.757 1.809 4.348 13.313
D-3 303 267,900 0.156 0.190 0.338 0.760 1.821 4.341 13.306
Potential Area in Rice Cultivation (ha)1.092 1.056 1.421 2.999 5.272 9.053 16.487
Simulation P PT
D-4 254 125,500 0.225 0.273 0.487 1.094 2.870 8.064 26.824
D-5 216 86,000 0.182 0.221 0.393 0.883 2.066 8.571 27.174
D-6 179 55,900 0.140 0.170 0.303 0.681 1.386 9.090 27.184
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Table  9：  Equi l ibr ium Farm Income (1000  yen)  in  the  F la t  Agr icu l tura l
Area  in  the  Tofuken  Reg ion
Tofuken, Farm Size (ha) 0-0.3 0.3-0.5 0.5-1.0 1.0-2.0 2.0-3.0 3.0-5.0 5.0-10.0 10.0+
Farm Income 1994 (1000 yen)* n.a. 80 428 963 2,051 3,894 7,556
Non-Farm Income 1994 (1000 yen)* n.a. 6,464 6,868 6,707 6,334 5,883 3,638
Pensions and Grants 1994 (100 yen)* n.a. 2,287 2,210 1,817 1,655 1,689 1,461
Farm Income in 1994 KSC  (1000 yen)** 164 242 530 1,002 2,319 3,335 5,546 10,058
Simulation P PT
A-1 327 266,400 354 493 828 1,465 2,679 4,343 7,506 14,533
A-2 296 199,900 322 441 739 1,289 2,352 3,817 6,650 12,726
A-3 298 203,800 324 444 744 1,299 2,371 3,849 6,703 12,837
A-4 236 91,100 289 382 636 1,084 1,934 3,138 5,600 10,398
A-5 195 54,200 266 347 574 964 1,640 2,623 4,681 8,537
A-6 161 32,900 253 328 541 899 1,451 2,272 4,010 7,198
Simulation P PT
B-1 317 532,500 369 541 927 1,658 2,682 4,337 7,186 14,730
B-2 284 411,000 336 482 822 1,451 2,310 3,798 6,304 12,781
B-3 288 424,700 340 489 833 1,474 2,353 3,861 6,406 13,004
B-4 210 198,700 305 413 696 1,200 1,859 3,105 5,178 10,288
B-5 174 128,800 281 373 624 1,061 1,579 2,632 4,418 8,639
B-6 148 89,100 267 351 584 983 1,426 2,337 3,940 7,609
Simulation P PT
C-4 202 111,700 335 452 764 1,344 2,095 3,104 4,868 8,651
C-5 162 73,700 302 402 673 1,164 1,762 2,570 3,983 6,943
C-6 139 55,300 286 377 629 1,077 1,600 2,310 3,553 6,113
Simulation P PT
D-1 329 271,200 356 497 835 1,478 2,702 4,380 7,564 14,656
D-2 302 211,700 327 450 754 1,320 2,411 3,914 6,809 13,060
D-3 303 213,800 328 452 757 1,325 2,421 3,930 6,836 13,116
D-4 254 111,800 303 403 671 1,154 2,087 3,397 6,047 11,309
D-5 216 71,500 276 363 602 1,019 1,781 2,874 5,134 9,453
D-6 179 43,300 259 337 557 930 1,545 2,449 4,354 7,884
Note: The figures for 1-2 ha farms are from actual data on 1-1.5 ha farms. The figures for 2-3 ha farms are from
actual data on 2-2.5 ha farms. Those figures are based on The 1994 N uka Keizai Cyosa.  The KSC figure for
1-2 ha farms is from actual data on 1-1.5 ha farms.
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Table  10：  Equi l ibr ium Farm Income (1000  yen)  in  the  F la t  Agr icu l tura l
Area  in  the  Hokkaido  Reg ion
Hokkaido, Farm Size (ha) 0-0.3 0.3-0.5 0.5-1.0 1.0-3.0 3.0-5.0 5.0-10.0 10.0+
Farm Income in 1994 KSC  (1000 yen)* n.a. n.a. n.a. 2,300 3,110 5,766 10,076
Simulation P PT
A-1 327 321,400 327 477 795 1,607 3,399 6,430 10,992
A-2 296 253,400 295 432 713 1,404 3,038 5,699 9,521
A-3 298 257,500 297 434 718 1,415 3,059 5,743 9,611
A-4 236 105,600 352 450 691 1,267 2,767 5,006 8,394
A-5 195 67,900 296 392 605 1,081 2,457 4,202 6,749
A-6 161 43,900 263 358 554 972 2,283 3,663 5,678
Simulation P PT
B-1 317 537,900 325 493 831 1,743 3,689 5,602 9,585
B-2 284 419,700 294 445 742 1,512 3,288 4,970 8,269
B-3 288 433,200 297 451 752 1,538 3,332 5,042 8,418
B-4 210 199,300 435 525 781 1,452 3,100 4,681 7,629
B-5 174 130,800 355 447 673 1,222 2,720 3,992 6,248
B-6 148 91,200 310 402 612 1,092 2,503 3,586 5,460
Simulation P PT
C-4 202 97,500 351 453 699 1,300 3,114 4,411 6,940
C-5 162 58,800 294 393 611 1,103 2,678 3,682 5,670
C-6 139 41,400 268 366 571 1,015 2,482 3,353 5,099
Simulation P PT
D-1 329 326,100 329 480 801 1,621 3,425 6,481 11,093
D-2 302 265,800 301 440 728 1,440 3,101 5,834 9,792
D-3 303 267,900 301 441 730 1,446 3,112 5,857 9,837
D-4 254 125,500 383 482 739 1,371 2,945 5,413 9,243
D-5 216 86,000 323 419 645 1,168 2,601 4,592 7,542
D-6 179 55,900 279 375 579 1,025 2,367 3,934 6,212
Note: The figures for 1-3 ha farms are from actual data on 2-3 ha farms.  The 1994 Nouka Keizai Cyosa does

























Effec t s  o f  the  Removal  o f  Acreage  Contro l s  and






















A-4 and Imports 
with elasticity 1.0
